Reasonable Classification and the Test of Arbitrariness Under Article 14

Article 14 does not forbid the State from treating people differently. It forbids unreasonable difference. The Supreme Court checks this in two ways: the reasonable classification test (is there an intelligible differentia, and does it have a rational nexus with the object of the law?) and the arbitrariness test (is the law or action capricious, irrational or without an adequate determining principle?).

This explainer is written for B.A. LL.B. and LL.B. students preparing for constitutional law papers, and for any reader who wants to know why courts strike down some laws as "unequal". If you understand these two tests and can name the cases that built them, you can answer almost any Article 14 question in an exam.

What does Article 14 actually say?

The text is short: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." Two ideas sit inside that one sentence.

• Equality before the law is a negative idea. No one is above the law, and the State cannot grant special privileges at will.
• Equal protection of the laws is a positive idea. People in similar situations must be treated alike, which means people in different situations may be treated differently.

Notice the words "any person". The guarantee is not limited to citizens. A company, or a foreign national living in Kanyakumari, can also invoke it. Historically, the equality clause began inside Draft Article 15 (which also dealt with life and liberty) and was split out as a separate Article 14 by the Drafting Committee in its letter of 3 November 1949 to the President of the Constituent Assembly.

What is the reasonable classification test?

Because the second limb allows different treatment for different groups, the courts needed a way to tell a fair classification from an unfair one. The answer came early, in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, decided on 11 January 1952. The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 let the State Government send any case it chose to a special court with a shorter procedure. The majority held Section 5(1) of that Act void under Article 14, because it gave the government unguided power to pick cases without any stated policy.

From this line of cases the two-part test was settled, and it was restated in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar ([1959] SCR 279) and applied again in Kangsari Haldar v. State of West Bengal (decided 18 December 1959), where the majority called it a "dual test". A classification is valid only if:

1. it is founded on an intelligible differentia that separates the people or things grouped together from those left out; and
2. that differentia has a rational nexus with the object the law seeks to achieve.

Take a simple example. A scheme giving free bus passes to students under 18 travelling to school in Nagercoil classifies by age and student status. The difference is easy to understand, and it connects to the purpose of supporting school attendance. Now imagine the same scheme limited to students whose surnames begin with "A". The group is identifiable, but the line has nothing to do with the purpose. It fails the second limb.

Two further points from Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 41) and Ram Krishna Dalmia come up often in exams: a single person or company can, in special circumstances, form a class by itself, and the burden of showing that a classification is unreasonable lies on the person who challenges it.

Where did the arbitrariness test come from?

Classification works well when a law creates groups. It struggles when a law or order treats no identifiable group differently but is simply unreasonable. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), Justice Bhagwati described equality as a dynamic concept and treated it as the antithesis of arbitrariness. An arbitrary act is, by its nature, unequal.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) carried this forward by reading Articles 14, 19 and 21 together: a procedure that deprives a person of liberty must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. For many years, though, it was unclear whether arbitrariness alone could strike down a statute passed by a legislature. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell and Co. (1996), the Court said that no enactment can be struck down just by saying it is arbitrary or unreasonable.

What is "manifest arbitrariness" after Shayara Bano?

The turning point is Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, the instant triple talaq case. Justice Nariman's opinion treated the McDowell observation as per incuriam and held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary, meaning something done by the legislature "capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle". Laws that are excessive and disproportionate can also fall within this idea.

The test was then used in 2018 in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, which struck down Section 497 of the old Indian Penal Code (adultery), and in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, where Justice Nariman held Section 377 IPC manifestly arbitrary in its application to consensual adult relationships.

Where does the law stand in 2026?

Both tests are good law and are used side by side. Two recent decisions show the arbitrariness test in action:

• Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113 (15 February 2024): the five-judge bench in the electoral bonds case relied on Shayara Bano and held that unlimited political funding by companies was manifestly arbitrary under Article 14.
• Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar (10 March 2026): a two-judge bench struck down a 2015 Bihar Act that took over a single trust-run library and institute, finding it "manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14". The bench (Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.) noted that the Act targeted "a single institution for complete takeover" without disclosing any intelligible basis for that treatment.

Courts still apply the doctrine with restraint. The 2026 judgment says the power to strike down a statute on this ground "must be exercised with care and restraint", to keep the balance between legislature and judiciary. It also looked for concrete reasons in the record: the Court found no inquiry or finding of mismanagement that justified a full takeover, and noted that milder options such as grant conditions and audits were available. That is a useful pattern for answers: show what the State failed to justify, not just that you dislike the policy.

How should you write about Article 14 in an exam?

1. Open with the text and separate the two limbs in one or two lines.
2. State the classification test with its two conditions, citing Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) and Ram Krishna Dalmia.
3. Explain the shift through E.P. Royappa (1974) and Maneka Gandhi (1978).
4. Cover the statutory question: McDowell (1996), then Shayara Bano (2017).
5. Bring it up to date with the electoral bonds case (2024) and one 2026 example.
6. Apply, do not just list. In a problem question, ask: who is classified, on what basis, for what object, and is the result capricious or disproportionate?

Examiners reward correct case names and years far more than long quotations. If you are planning your study of constitutional law across semesters, see our programmes page for how the subject is placed in each course.

Sources

• Constitution of India: Article 14: text of the Article and its drafting history.
• Kangsari Haldar v. State of West Bengal (1959): judgment discussing Anwar Ali Sarkar and the two-part classification test.
• LiveLaw: Justice Nariman's revival of manifest arbitrariness: explainer on McDowell, Shayara Bano, Joseph Shine and Navtej Singh Johar.
• Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 113: the electoral bonds judgment.
• The Leaflet: report on the electoral bonds verdict: summary of the Article 14 finding on corporate funding.
• Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar (10 March 2026): judgment text applying manifest arbitrariness to a state Act.