Daughters as Coparceners: Hindu Succession After Vineeta Sharma

Under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, a daughter in a Mitakshara joint family is a coparcener by birth, with the same rights and liabilities as a son. In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1, decided on 11 August 2020, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court held that this right flows from birth, so it does not matter whether the father was alive on 9 September 2005, the date the amendment came into force.

This explainer is for B.A. LL.B. and LL.B. students preparing family law papers, and for families who want to know where a daughter stands in a partition dispute over ancestral land. The dates matter, so learn them exactly.

What does Section 6 say after 2005?

The substituted Section 6 has five sub-sections. The parts you must know are these:

• Section 6(1): from the commencement of the 2005 Amendment, the daughter of a coparcener (a) becomes a coparcener by birth in her own right in the same manner as a son, (b) has the same rights in coparcenary property as a son, and (c) is subject to the same liabilities.
• Proviso to Section 6(1): dispositions and alienations, including partitions and testamentary dispositions, that took place before 20 December 2004 are not affected.
• Section 6(3): where a Hindu dies after the 2005 Amendment, his interest in Mitakshara joint family property devolves by testamentary or intestate succession, not by survivorship. The property is deemed divided as if a partition had taken place, and the daughter is allotted the same share as a son.
• Section 6(4): courts will no longer enforce the "pious obligation" of a son, grandson or great grandson to pay the debts of his ancestors.
• Section 6(5) and its Explanation: the section does not apply to a partition effected before 20 December 2004. "Partition" here means a partition by a deed duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or a partition by decree of a court.

Why did the Supreme Court need to decide Vineeta Sharma?

Two earlier decisions pulled in different directions. In Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36, the Court held that Section 6 was not retrospective and applied only where both the father coparcener and the daughter were alive on 9 September 2005. In Danamma v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343, another bench gave a daughter a share even though her father had died before 2005. Trial courts were left unsure which line to follow, and the question went to a larger bench of Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer and M.R. Shah, JJ.

What did Vineeta Sharma hold?

The conclusions are set out in paragraph 137 of the judgment. In simple terms:

1. Substituted Section 6 confers coparcener status on a daughter born before or after the amendment, in the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities.
2. A daughter born earlier can claim these rights with effect from 9 September 2005, subject to the savings in Section 6(1) for dispositions, alienations and partitions before 20 December 2004.
3. Because the right is by birth, the father coparcener need not have been living on 9 September 2005.
4. The statutory fiction of partition under the proviso to the original Section 6 did not bring about an actual partition or disruption of the coparcenary.
5. Given the Explanation to Section 6(5), a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition. The Court allowed a narrow exception where the partition is backed by public documents and proved as if it had been effected by a decree. A plea based on oral evidence alone is to be rejected.

In paragraph 139 the Court overruled the contrary views in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju, and overruled Danamma in part, to the extent it was contrary. In paragraph 138 it requested that pending matters be decided, as far as possible, within six months.

How has the Madras High Court applied it?

Three Madras High Court decisions show the rule at work:

• Rangammal v. Sundarambal (S.A. No. 294 of 2010, decided 25 February 2021): the trial court, confirmed by the first appellate court, had limited a daughter to a 1/6 share because her father was not alive when the amendment came in. Following Vineeta Sharma, R.N. Manjula, J. held that she was a coparcener regardless, and gave each of the three heirs a 1/3 share.
• Thenmozhi v. Kousalya (A.S. No. 307 of 2015, decided 2 March 2023): a Division Bench noted that Tamil Nadu had its own earlier reform, Section 29-A inserted by the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, which did not help a daughter married before that state amendment began. Her claim succeeded instead under the 2005 central amendment read with Vineeta Sharma. The Bench also upheld the father's Will only for his own half share.
• K. Kailasamoorthy v. N. Indiradevi (A.S. No. 562 of 2017, decided 21 November 2023): property a father received in a 1959 partition with his brothers was held ancestral, and his daughter could claim as a coparcener even though he died in 1965. The Bench also held that Article 110 of the Limitation Act did not bar her suit, as she had not been excluded.

What does this mean for a family today?

Take a student in Nagercoil whose grandfather left ancestral agricultural land that was never formally divided. Her father died in 2001. Before 2020, a court following Phulavati might have denied her coparcener status. After Vineeta Sharma, she is a coparcener with the same share as her brother, unless the family can prove a partition by registered deed or court decree before 20 December 2004, or a sale or other disposition before that date. A brother who says "we divided it orally in 1998" will not succeed on oral evidence alone; he would need public documents showing that division.

Partition suits are civil matters governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so the 2024 criminal law changes (BNS, BNSS, BSA) do not alter this rule. Families who cannot afford a lawyer can approach the District Legal Services Authority, and students can see such cases at the college legal aid clinic.

How should you write this in an exam?

1. Begin with the old Mitakshara rule: only males were coparceners, and the interest passed by survivorship.
2. Set out Section 6(1), 6(3) and 6(5) with the Explanation, naming both dates: 20 December 2004 and 9 September 2005.
3. Explain the conflict between Phulavati (2016) and Danamma (2018).
4. State the Vineeta Sharma conclusions and the cases overruled.
5. Add one Madras High Court decision and a line on Section 29-A for Tamil Nadu.
6. Apply the law to the facts in the question, and check for any pre-2004 registered partition or alienation.

Sources

• Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (Supreme Court, 11 August 2020): full judgment text, including the substituted Section 6.
• Shivpalsingh Gour v. Ganesh Bisen (Bombay High Court, 8 July 2021): reproduces paragraphs 137 to 139 of Vineeta Sharma.
• Rangammal v. Sundarambal (Madras High Court, 25 February 2021): application of Vineeta Sharma to a pre-2005 death.
• Thenmozhi v. Kousalya (Madras High Court, 2 March 2023): Section 29-A and the 2005 amendment.
• K. Kailasamoorthy v. N. Indiradevi (Madras High Court, 21 November 2023): ancestral property and limitation.
• Renuka v. Savantrevva (Karnataka High Court, 25 July 2025): limits of Vineeta Sharma and Section 8 devolution.